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Abstract
One of the “Grand Challenges” in spectrum sharing that was identified by leading researchers was automating
the enforcement of spectrum sharing [1]. In general, the automation of enforcement has numerous challenges,
including the detection of events, gathering forensic evidence surrounding the event, maintaining the security
and provenance of the records, and conducting adjudication that is consistent with the extant rights structure
[2]. To illustrate this challenge, Shay et.al. [3] conducted a simple experiment surrounding the enforcement of
traffic laws. One of the “Grand Challenges” in spectrum sharing that was identified by leading researchers was
automating the enforcement of spectrum sharing. In general, the automation of enforcement has numerous
challenges, including the detection of events, gathering forensic evidence surrounding the event, maintaining
the security and provenance of the records, and conducting adjudication that is consistent with the extant rights
structure. This work will be looking at the enforcement aspect in the spectrum sharing regime, especially on
ex-post enforcement by using Block-chain technology to automate the ex-post enforcement processes. The
potential usages can be divided into three applications which are ex-post enforcement using Block-chain by
itself as Publicly-Distributed-Database, ex-post enforcement using Smart Contract, ex-post enforcement as
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)
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Introduction
Spectrum sharing policy was introduced to utilize the spec-
trum properly and to overcome limitations in access to radio
spectrum. In a broad sense, this amounts to a reformation
of rights relationships between the spectrum sharing entities.
The stakeholders in the sharing arrangement include the (in-
cumbent) Primary Users (PU) who hold the spectrum license,
and the (entrant) Secondary User (s) who may use the spec-
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trum temporarily or with rights that are subordinate to the
license holders. A set of strategies and technologies are re-
quired to enforce rights in any management system [4] and the
timing of the enforcement action (ex-ante and ex-post) plays
a significant role in such a management system [5]. Ex-ante
enforcement is measures are designed to prevent stakeholder
rights from being violated. In most discussions, this focusses
on ways of protecting a PU’s signal from harmful interfer-
ence caused by an SU [6, 7], while ex post mechanisms deal
with addressing the consequences of interference after the
fact. Practical enforcement schemes have ex-ante and ex-post
enforcement that are coupled.
The analysis performed in [2] suggests that this approach
is too narrow. The authors note that SUs have usage rights
that deserve to be enforced as well, and that the collective
action rights associated with spectrum sharing may require
enforcement measures beyond interference. Collective action
rights include the right to determine who may use spectrum
(and when they may use it) and who may determine who
is excluded. The Commerce Spectrum Management Advi-
sory Committee (CSMAC) counsels the National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration (NTIA) on any
matter related to spectrum policy. CSMAC’s enforcement
subcommittee report suggested that the emergent spectrum
sharing systems to use geolocation databases (e.g., TeleVi-
sion Wight Space (TVWS) databases and Spectrum Access
Systems (SAS)) to mediate spectrum access, so the enforce-
ment of the collective action rights amounts to requiring trans-
parency of decision making as well as audits of these systems.
As we move to more intensive sharing of spectrum, the likeli-
hood of events that are enforceable ex post increases, despite
ex ante measures. The Enhancing Access to the Radio Spec-
trum (EARS) second workshop report [1] recognized this and
set the goal of lowering the costs by automating some of the
ex-post enforcement steps.
This paper will study the enforcement in Spectrum Access
Systems (SAS) based spectrum sharing regimes. We focus in
particular on the enforcement events that occur in the normal
course of spectrum sharing (i.e., Type 1 events as described
in Table 1); in doing so, we exclude treatment of “rogue” or
“pirate” radios, and of interference due to equipment failures
of devices and systems that are not participants in the sharing
regime. These excluded events are important to address, but
we hold that they require a distinct enforcement methodology
that may not be amenable to automation under today’s tech-
nology.
In our analysis, we consider two architectures for enforcement
systems: a third party enforcer and a self-reporting approach
[8]. In the third party enforcer approach, the enforcer must be
trusted by all the entities of the system and must have author-
ity to resolve enforcement violation events [9].
We will examine how these two architecture apply in the
enforcement of usage as well as collective action rights. A
hypothetical scenario of using the recommended ex-ante en-
forcement (protection zones) and the involved entities will be
used to analyze ex-post enforcement steps and the enforcer
role in both architectures. This hypothetical scenario concerns
about the behavior of the SUs is significant / of concern if
SU-mobile devices transmit near PU-base station or if they
are transmitting high power signals within the protection zone.
These behaviors will cause harmful interference to the PU
signal and data received by the PU will be lost. For ex-post
enforcement, we will follow the graduated response approach
that had been suggested in [10].
The role of the enforcer in the ex-post enforcement is to pre-
vent, detect, conduct forensic analysis, adjudicate, and control
parties’ behaviors. In the self-reporting approach, PU and SU
would report their own activities to spectrum sharing enforce-
ment authority (which could be SAS for this architecture)
when they violated the spectrum sharing policy. Following
the self-reporting approach, the detection and forensic roles
will be deducted from the enforcer because parties report their
violation act, in addition, reducing the risk of getting uncertain
sanctions when violating the spectrum sharing policy.
This paper is divided as follows: section 2 will give a histori-
cal background. Section 3 will provide the motivation and the
purpose from this work. Section 4 will explain the structure of
the automated enforcement system. Section 5 will introduce
the Block-chain and how does it work. Section 6 will explain
the Block-chain usages and its potential applications to en-
force Spectrum Sharing policy between the sharing parties.
Section 7 will discuss and conclude this work.
1. Background
As spectrum sharing has moved from the laboratory into com-
mercial systems, the efficient, effective and predicable en-
forcement of rights has become more critical. As shown by
[11] and [2], the notion of rights becomes more complex in
shared spectrum. The rights bundle that users are endowed
with consist of usage rights (right to transmit, right to receive)
as well as collective action rights (management rights, ex-
clusion rights, appropriation rights). Both classes of rights
deserve both definition and enforcement, even if most of the at-
tention today is on enforcing usage rights, which involves the
prevention or detection of interference between multiple users.
Weiss et.al. [2] have made a case for the need to enforce col-
lective action rights as well as interference rights in spectrum
sharing systems. To date, collective action rights have been ex-
erted through the NTIA’s CSMAC process1 and in the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) (through the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act (APA)). In spectrum sharing systems,
these collective actions are codified in software-based SAS
systems which will require transparency as well. Since these
collective action rights are not fully recognized or understood,
they are not amenable to automation at this time.
Enforceable interference events might be subdivided into four
distinct types, as outlined in Table 1. Each type of interference
1The Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee (CSMAC):
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/csmac
Automating Ex-Post Enforcement for Spectrum Sharing:
A new application for Block-chain technology — 3/19
Type 1 Events due to the routine operation of
participants in a sharing ecosystem
Type 2 Events due to “rogue” or malicious users
Type 3 Events due to faulty equipment of authorized
spectrum users
Type 4 Events when all users are in compliance
with all applicable regulations
Table 1. A typology of interference events
calls for different technical, operational and legal approaches.
Type 1 interference events might occur due to aggregation of
similar devices, propagation anomalies, location errors, etc.
In these kinds of events, we expect that the radios are compli-
ant with applicable technical and operational regulations. We
cannot say the same about Type 2 interference, which might
be software radios that have temporarily been programmed to
operate in a band and may not make an effort at compliance
with the appropriate technical and operational requirements.
These may or may not have a typical physical characteristic
that would allow them to be automatically identified. Type
3 events are due to leaky cables, poor filters, etc. We would
expect these to be licensed devices that fit no particular patter
or lack a particular physical characteristic. Type 4 events oc-
cur when regulations or licenses are incomplete and/or poorly
written or assigned.
For the purpose of this paper, we consider only Type 1 events
because we believe that these are most amenable to automated
enforcement. In these cases, the ex post enforcement process,
consisting of detection, forensic analysis, and adjudication, is
most straight-forward. Type 1 users who cause interference
will not actively try to mask their identity and The character-
istics of their transmitted signal is most likely understood2,
making detection easier. They will most likely cooperate
with the forensics process, and they will most likely respond
cooperatively to the outcomes of the adjudication process.
2. Motivation and Purpose
In the US, much of the attention on spectrum sharing is be-
tween federal users and commercial users. Thus, the Primary
User (PU) or the spectrum incumbent is a federal agency
and the secondary user (SU) with subordinate rights is the
commercial user. Sharing agreements are worked out in the
Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory Committee (CS-
MAC), which counsels the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) on any matter related to
spectrum policy. A part of such agreement includes the ap-
plicable enforcement regime which might be propylactic in
nature (i.e. ex ante) or remunerative (ex post). The CSMAC’s
enforcement subcommittee report suggested that the Spec-
trum Access System (SAS) could play a role in implementing
enforcement mechanisms for spectrum sharing. To do that,
SAS expected architecture and responsibilities to manage both
2This is notably not true for military radars and other military signals.
Figure 1. Prototype of SAS from [2, 12]
spectrum assignment and harmful interference were explained
in [12]. Figure ?? shows SAS architecture base on a model
from [2, 12]. Sohul et. al summerized SAS duties as follows
[12]:
1. It would need to access PU’s database to collect infor-
mation about the PU spectrum utilization.
2. It would need to coordinate with the regulator to update
the policy.
3. It also would need to access SU’s database to get: 1)
devices geolocation, 2) interference environment, 3)
radio constraint, 4) and spectrum request.
4. It would the ability to:
(a) allocate spectrum on the dynamic bases,
(b) detect and resolve any unwanted interference event.
Figure 1 shows SAS model which relies on a central au-
thority (central-closed database, and central manager (con-
troller)) to enforce the spectrum sharing rights among the PU
and SU. On the other side, the CSMAC enforcement sub-
committee report recommended NTIA to use a third party
to enforce the users rights for the spectrum sharing regime.
In such a centralized system with a closed-database would
require the third party enforcer to go through a costly secu-
rity measures to be certified. These certification costs would
impact heavily on the cost of the ex-post enforcement. If the
cost of the ex-post enforcement is too high, the sharing entity
would prefer not to share the spectrum as a result.
Further, Shavell and Kaplow studied a model of probabilis-
tic law enforcement to on how to control harmful behaviors
[8]. They added to the model a self-reporting approach and
compared it to the approach without self-reporting mecha-
nism. The self-reporting approach is when entities can be
encouraged to report their harmful actions without signifi-
cantly affecting their incentives whether or not to commit
the act. They found out that the enforcement system with a
self-reporting approach would save the enforcement resources,
and the risk of getting uncertain penalties would be reduced.
In spectrum sharing, self-reporting approach is when PU and
SU would report their own activities to spectrum sharing en-
forcement authority. Unfortunately, self-reporting approach is
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Figure 2. Spectrum Access System (SAS) with a centralized
database
not applicable with such centralized-closed-database.
Figure 2 shows an example on spectrum sharing between
the PU and SU when using SAS with a centralized database.
The sharing entities are : 1) PU, 2) SU, 3) And CSMAC
report added a SAS provider. To enforce the users rights, SAS
provider would play the role of the manager, the data provider,
and the enforcer. To enforce the rights of the spectrum sharing,
SAS would need to access both PU and SU databases. To
monitor the spectrum, sensors need to be built around the
PU base stations. These sensors will have a range called
protection zone to detect any harmful interference. We will be
looking at the enforcement aspect in this case. SAS provider
would take inputs from incumbents regarding their spectrum
utilization and manage the secondary use of the available
spectrum opportunities.
If a SU wishes to transmit, it requests the SAS [2]. SAS would
decide whether or not to authorize the SU’s transmission based
on: 1) a database, 2) the license outline. The license outline
should be populated and sustained mutually by the regulator
and the PU. Every time there a violation spectrum sharing
rights, SAS enforcer would access the database for the data to
apply the remedies to the violator. With centralized database
as the example on Figure 2, then the data would reside with the
SAS provider. The SAS provider would have pile of potential
exclusive information that is possibly vulnerable and It could
be a hacking target.
2.1 SAS with a publicly-distributed-database
An alternative to the centralized management scheme when
using Block-chain technology. The Block-chain technology is
a publicly-distributed-database. The Block-chain technology
provides an opportunity for any system to be an open reliable
and democratic, such when used on the economic system. We
aim to build the wireless-telecommunication industry sym-
bolized in spectrum sharing regime that is open, reliable, and
democratic. We introduce Block-chain technology to be used
for Spectrum Access System (SAS) to automate the ex-post
enforcement processes.
Figure 3 shows the same example of Figure 2 but with
the usage of the Block-chain technology (publicly-ditributed-
database). The SAS controller coordinate with the PU and SU.
SAS provider would play the role of the controller, the data
Figure 3. Spectrum Access System (SAS) with a
Block-chain (publicly-distributed-database)
provide. SAS provider also might play the role of the enforcer
or the role could be played by an external entity since the
database is public, distributed, and stored by all the involved
entities. In this example we hypothesize that enforcer is under
the SAS provider responsibilities. To monitor the spectrum,
sensors need to be built around the PU base stations. The
Spectrum sharing database would be distributed and stored
among the sharing entities. Every time there a violation for the
users rights, SAS enforcer will apply the violation remedies
based the publicly-distributed-database.
The example on Figure 3 shows that Block-chain technology
will provide:
1. The opportunity to SAS to be open, reliable and demo-
cratic system.
2. Data is stored in every node
3. Even if a system fails the integrity of the distributed
database is maintained.
4. Enable users to control their own information rather
than giving it to a centralized entity
On the other side, the performance of the distributed
database is always under question. And the traffic of the
network would increase. Also, When using PoW as a voting
tool for the Block-chain to reach consensus, the power and
process consumption may also become a limitation when used
with devices that had limited processors and power.
3. Brief Introduction on the Block-chain
Technology
Block-chain is a promising technique that may have more us-
age in the near future. Block-chain technology is a a publicly-
distributed-database that can be used in any system. It can be
defined as a resilient, reliable, transparent and decentralized
way of storing and distributing a database across all nodes
of a network. The Block-chain is a database that contains
digital actions, in general. These digital actions might be
transactions, a registry system, an inventory system, tracking,
or monitoring assets [13]. These digital actions propagate
from one entity to another through the system with the help of
a digital token. A digital token is a unique address specified
only for a certain digital action. The Block-chain application
can only decide on the representation of the digital token,
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whether it is payment, a transferring of fund, or registering a
property.
The main benefits when using Block-chain technology in
a system are: 1) the database is stored in each node connected
to the network, and 2) It is used to store and distribute any
action in the network to all the nodes. The Block-chain tech-
nology provides an opportunity for the economic system to
be an open, reliable, and democratic system [14]. That op-
portunity opens the door for researchers to try implementing
this technique on other system’s applications as well. We aim
to build the wireless-telecommunication industry symbolized
in spectrum sharing regime that is open, reliable, and demo-
cratic.
In the last two years in the United States, over $00 million
has been invested in Block-chain associated technology [15].
In addition, some of the largest financial companies funded
startup corporations to find Block-chain applications to be ap-
plied on Wall Street [15]. In fact, in 2015, the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)
lunched the Linq platform, based on Block-chain technol-
ogy, from the startup Chain to trade non-public shares [16].
IBM and Samsung are experimenting with Block-chain tech-
nology to power the Internet of Things (IoT) [17]. Swan
named the Block-chain as the fifth most disruptive comput-
ing paradigm after mainframes, PCs, the internet, and mo-
bile/social networking [13]. Andressen3 elected the Block-
chain technique as the most important invention since the
internet itself [17, 18].
Block-chain is used as a supportive technique for Bitcoin [13].
Smart contract is another example of using Block-chain as
a supportive technology to implement and monitor contract
terms [14]. Nick Szabo proposed the idea of a smart con-
tract [19], but was not well-known until the emergence of
cryptographic currency [14]. Block-chain takes advantage of
cryptographic methods to guarantee both trust and reliability
of the blocks. Any Block within the Block-chain consists
of digitally signed actions that are approved by the network.
Each Block contains a reference to its ancestor Block to form
a Block-chain. Block-chain technology can be used to support
many types of applications (financial, economic, market, cash
transactions, government, health, or science) [13].
The Block-chain is simply a chain of Blocks that represent a
public ledger stored and distributed among all the nodes of a
network. Depending on the application that it is used for, a
Block records all the digital actions between the nodes of a
network, which contain the date and time, and a reference to
its ancestor Block [17]. Figure 4 shows how the Block-chain
is interconnected from the first Block to the last one and the
assembly of the Block. The Block consists of a header, Block
size, digital action counter, and list of digital actions [21].
The digital action contains contributors, the date, time, and
activity. In Bitcoin, the average size of the digital actions
(transactions) is, at a minimum, 250 bytes; and the average
3Marc Andressen is an American entrepreneur and founder of Netscape.
Block holds over 500 digital actions, while the header size is
fixed to 80 bytes [21]. The header fields of each Block are
a time stamp, nonce, a hash of previous Blocks, and Merkle
root [22]. The time stamp is the approximate creation time of
the Block. The nonce is a counter used to ensure each digital
action is only handled one time [23]. The hash of the previous
Block is used to link this block to the prior one to construct
the chain of Blocks. The Merkle root is the Hash of the Block
(Block’s fingerprint). It is a digest of all the transactions in
the Block [21]. The Merkle root is used to verify the integrity
of the Block. As shown in Figure 4, the Merkle root is created
by repeatedly digesting pairs of digital actions until there is
one root hash [21].
Next we will give a brief explanation about an important pro-
cess within the Block-chain technology called mining because
it may play an important role when adopting the Block-chain
technology. (More in-detail information about the Block-
chain technology in Appendix A).
3.1 Mining
When a new digital action needs to be validated and added
to the Block-chain, the Mining procedure is used [21]. It
is used to protect the Block-chain against falsified digital
actions (such as double-spending in a Bitcoin network or void
signatures) [21, 24]. Miners4 authenticate new digital actions
and add them to the publicly-distributed-database [21]. Digital
actions are grouped into a single Block and are validated
periodically5. However, in other cryptographic currency such
Litecoin, the transactions are grouped in a single Block every
10 minutes [20]. Miners compete amongst each other to find
a solution to intensive and pressing mathematical puzzles
[27]. The greater the processor’s power the miners put in, the
greater the chance of finding the solution and wining. If a
miner solves the mathematical puzzle, the miner broadcasts
the Block of the digital-actions to all the nodes of the network
to be approved. This approval step is called Consensus model.
All the other nodes in the network check the Block to verify
that the miner solved the Mathematical puzzle. If more than
fifty percent of the nodes agree, that Block of digital-actions
is added to the Block-chain [27].
Mining is the process of solving a challenging mathematical
problem (mathematical riddle) based on the cryptographic
hash algorithm. Miners participate to solve the mathematical
problem by applying the Hash function to the block header
frequently by changing one parameter until the outcome string
of characters matches a certain goal [21]. The mining process
is achieved by harnessing the computing power of the Miners
to discover valid Blocks [28].
Table 2 shows several voting tools that are used in practice.
4Miners is a generalized term and they are equivalent the Bitcoin Miners.
5In the Bitcoin network, the transactions are grouped in single Blocks
every ten minutes on average [25]. Ten minutes is the average time to find a
Block. The ten minutes was Nakamoto’s choice as a trade-off between first
confirmation time and the amount of work wasted due to chain split [26].
However, in other cryptographic currencys, such Litecoin, the transactions
are grouped in a single Block every two minutes [20]
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Figure 4. chain of Blocks [20]
Voting tool Advantages Disadvantages Resource Model
Proof-of-Work
(PoW)
-Decentralized
control.
-Power and process
consumption.
Solving the mathe-
matical puzzle→ pro-
cessor power → en-
ergy consumption
Bitcoin
Proof-of-Stake
(PoS)
-Decentralized
control.
-Lack of flexible trust. Certificate of Deposit
(CD)
NXT (registry, asset
exchange, secure
-Low latency. messaging, and stake
-Ease of rule. allocation)
Stellar Consensus
Protocol (SCP)
-Decentralized
control.
-Manual broadcasting
for the root token
Quorum vote (peer
standing)
Vumi (Under develop-
ment)
-Low latency.
-Flexible trust
Ripple consensus
algorithm
-Decentralized
control.
-Network monitoring Exceptional node list
based on peer reputa-
tion
Ripple
Table 2. Shows several voting tools or consensus protocols adopted from [29]
The voting tool is run by a mining software in order to reach
consensus among the mining nodes in a network to solve a
mathematical puzzle (problem). The most common voting
tool is Proof of Work (PoW); it is used in the Bitcoin network
and was introduced in 2002 [30]. To validate a Block us-
ing PoW, a certain cryptographic hash, including the Block’s
component, is formed, and must be below a threshold value
(miners need to complete a brute-force exploration for a par-
tial hash collision) [31]. This is to guarantee that a Block
cannot be altered without doing all the work associated with
finding the hash collision [31]. There are other types of voting
tools, such Proof of Stack (PoS) [32] and Stellar Consensus
Protocol (SCP) [33]. Peercoin is a cryptographic currency
that uses PoW as a voting tool and, in addition, can use PoS
as an alternative voting tool as well [32]. Vumi is a mobile
messaging application, currently under development, that will
be built using SCP as its voting tool [34]. Explaining voting
tools is beyond the scope of this work and will be left for
future work.
Depending on the application of the Block-chain, Miners re-
ceive rewards for using their computational power to solve the
mathematical problem. For example, in the Bitcoin network
the rewards are coins for every new block, in addition to trans-
action fees from all the transactions within the Block [21].
These rewards motivate the Miners to secure the network,
while at the same time executing the distributed monetary
system.
4. Enforcement Architecture System
Last section gave an introduction about the Block-chain tec-
nology. This section will discuss the enforcement architecture
in detailed example.
In the past, the FCC assigned static spectrum bands to each
user. Using this approach it was possible to prevent most of
the interference between users. With the revolution in the
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telecommunications industry in the last two decades and the
lack of new dedicated spectrum bands, the federal government
proposed certain bands to be shared [6, 35, 36]. As discussed
elsewhere [2] sharing leads to a reconfiguration of rights rela-
tionships among stakeholders, which require enforcement if
they are to be viable.
Any rights system requires a set of strategies and technolo-
gies to enforce the rights [37] and the timing of the enforce-
ment action (ex-ante and ex-post) plays a significant role [38].
The general characteristics of the enforcement of rights were
applied to spectrum sharing in [39]. These characteristics are
[37, 39]: 1) enforcement timing action (ex-ante or ex-post);
2) form of the sanctions; and 3) party (ies) carrying out the
enforcement.
Shavell [38] argues that the timing of the enforcement
action plays an important role in any enforcement regime.
Enforcement actions can take place before (potential) inter-
ference events (ex-ante enforcement), or afterward (ex-post
enforcement). The spectrum sharing approaches that have
been proposed by the NTIA emphasize ex-ante actions, which
are designed to prevent a PU’s signal from harmful interfer-
ence that could occur by the SU [6, 39]. A comprehensive
enforcement framework would include protecting the rights
of the SU as well, in addition to having an ex post component
that can efficiently and effectively adjudicate claims of inter-
ference. The practical enforcement schemes have ex-ante and
ex-post enforcement that are linked together. Thus, the en-
forcement system would consist of: 1) ex-ante enforcement; 2)
ex-post enforcement; 3) and an enforcer. The enforcer could
be a third party enforcer or self-reporting enforcement system.
This work considers two architectures for enforcement
systems: a third party enforcer and a self-reporting approach
[8]. Third party enforcer approach, the enforcer must be
trusted by all the entities of the system and must have authority
to resolve enforcement violation events [9]. We will examine
how these two architecture apply in the enforcement of usage
as well as collective action rights. A hypothetical scenario
of using the recommended ex-ante enforcement (protection
zones) and the involved entities will be used to analyze ex-post
enforcement steps and the enforcer role in both architectures.
This hypothetical scenario concerns about the behavior of the
SUs is significant / of concern if SU-mobile devices transmit
near PU-base station or if they are transmitting high power
signals within the protection zone. These behaviors will cause
harmful interference to the PU signal and data received by the
PU will be lost. For the ex-post enforcement, we will follow
the graduated-response approach as an ex-post enforcement
measure that had been suggested in [10].
4.1 Ex-ante Enforcement
The ex-ante enforcement procedures consist of prevention
mechanisms that shape the activity before the harmful inter-
ference occurs. Examples of ex-ante enforcement are exclu-
sion zones, protection zones and Signal Interference to Noise
Ratio (SINR) limitations. Regulators prefer using an exclu-
sion zone to prevent harmful interference because this is less
complicated than other ex-ante enforcement mechanisms. A
protection zone is another ex-ante enforcement mechanism,
but costs more because it requires coordination between the
sharing entities when transmitting within the zone.
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee recommended that
the NTIA along with the FCC identify the ex-ante measures
of the operational and technical guidelines governing the spec-
trum sharing of federal government bands. These guidelines
include interference mitigation and enforcement procedures
to provide ample precision for PUs and prospective SUs [40].
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee recommended the
ex-ante enforcement measures to be applied when sharing the
spectrum which are 1) protection zones; 2) SINR limitation
to establish the interference threshold.
4.2 Ex-post Enforcement
The ex-post enforcement mechanisms consist of corrective
measures after a violation event has occurred. The corrective
measures may include penalties (such as fines, product recall,
or revocation of licenses) or modifications of rights between
parties or other kinds of sanctions (e.g., power penalties, trans-
mission moratoriums, etc.) such as in [41, 42]. In the US,
ex-post enforcement measures in spectrum sharing cases are
different because the spectrum is going to be shared between
Federal/non-federal and commercial usage. And each type of
these agencies has a different entity to govern the spectrum
usage. Those entities each have different ex-post measures.
The entity that governs the Federal spectrum users is the NTIA
but has no authority over non-federal users. Conversely, the
FCC governs non-federal uses but has no authority over fed-
eral spectrum users [40]. That is why we see differences in
ex-post enforcement measures between NTIA and the FCC.
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee report recognized
the differences and difficulty of relying on one entity (NTIA
or FCC) to govern if a harmful interference event occurred
between PU and SUs [40]. It recommended that NTIA and
the FCC enter into a new central Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) to govern spectrum sharing rights between
federal and non-federal users. By central-MOU, federal and
non-federal entities would rely on both the FCC and NTIA
to take necessary actions in the event there is a breach of a
sharing agreement.
The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee recommenda-
tion related to ex-post enforcement measures were discussed
in [10]. It was found that the specific-MOU would framework
enforcement rights and proper penalties of the sharing parties.
This recommendation will not be an ideal solution because it
would be under the umbrella of the Communications Act of
19346 and the Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines7.
6Communications Act of 1934 (last visited 9/9/16):
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf
7Forfeiture Proceedings guidelines(last visited 9/9/16):
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4.3 Enforcer
The role of the enforcer would be to detect, adjudicate, and
control parties’ behaviors. The enforcer must be trusted by all
the entities of the system and must have authority to resolve
enforcement violation events[9]. The parties could elect the
enforcer to resolve both the acceptability of a hypothetical
violation event and its costs [9].
In the US, telecommunications agencies can be divided into
two types: federal agencies and non-federal commercial agen-
cies. Each type of agency has a different enforcer (entity)
to govern spectrum usage. NTIA has authority over federal
spectrum users (which are the PU of the spectrum) but has no
authority over non-federal users (which are the SU of the spec-
trum). Conversely, the FCC governs non-federal spectrum use
but has no authority over federal spectrum users [40]. As a
result, a legal framework for implementing an enforcement
function must be developed. The enforcer would govern PU
and SU behaviors to 1) guarantee spectrum sharing rights are
enforced; 2) and assure that PU will not receive any harmful
interference signals from the SU.
The enforcer would need to monitor and detect the interfer-
ence events that affect the PU’s received signal and are caused
by the SU’s. A sensing system would need to be built around
the PU’s receiver. The sensor network should be able to detect
the aggregate signal energy attributable to the SU’s transmitted
signal. The sensor antennas would have a range equal to the
protection zone ranges depending on the specific sites. If the
signal energy is below noise level, it would not be detectable.
If the signal energy reaches the noise level, interference would
be detected and the enforcer would apply the ex-post enforce-
ment measures recommended by the specific-MOU, such as
penalizing the SU.
4.3.1 Third party enforcement system
Third party enforcement system means that the enforcement
system would be consist of ex-ante enforcement, ex-post en-
forcement and enforcer would be a third party. The role of
the third party would be to administer the behavior of the
sharing entities by policing and enforcing user’s rights in the
spectrum sharing regime. This governing role means that the
third party would prevent, detect, adjudicate to enforce the
spectrum sharing policy among the PU and SU to guarantee
the users rights. To be able of preventing and detecting and
responding to any harmful interference event, the third party
would need to:
1. Build a sensor network around the PU antenna. The
sensor antennas would have a range equal to the protec-
tion zone ranges depending on the specific site. If the
signal energy is below noise threshold level, it would
not be detectable. If the signal energy reaches the noise
level, interference would be detected.
2. Have access to SAS to monitor the spectrum. The
access would offer required evidence of interference
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idxSID=6c4588fbf26be630b7d3ce1862
fbee3e&mc=true&node=se47.1.1 180&rgn=div8
that might be required for the adjudication, forensic and
enforcement steps [40].
3. Trusted by the sharing entity. The enforcer should be
able to access the PU and SU communication systems
and databases to identify and allocate the violator to
collect the proper evidence to help in the adjudication
process.
CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee report recommended the
NTIA to consider a third party as an enforcer [40]. The third
party should pass an appropriate security clearance to govern
the spectrum sharing. The main purpose of this recommen-
dation is to reduce the time and capitals required to settle
harmful interference event. Additionally, if the interference
event occurs and following this recommendation, the NTIA
and FCC would not have to detect, forensic, and adjudicate
any interference event unless the issue is escalated by the
violator.
Currently, the Wireless-Telecommunication system in the US
relies on a central authority to manage the spectrum policy.
The central authority is dependent on a closed-database that is
used to register and approve any end-user. If SAS is built on
the same concept as the current management system that has
been used in -current Wireless-Telecommunication system, it
would be dependent on a central authority to enforce spectrum
sharing rights (centralized system); and the same concept of
closed-database usages would be repeated and used in the
spectrum sharing regime. Such a centralized system with a
closed-database would require the third party enforcer to go
through a costly security measures to be certified. These certi-
fication costs would impact heavily on the cost of the ex-post
enforcement. If the cost of the ex-post enforcement is too
high, the sharing entity would prefer not to share the spectrum
as a result.
4.3.2 Self-reporting enforcement system
Self-reporting approach, PU and SU would report their own
activities to spectrum sharing enforcement authority (which
could be SAS for this architecture) when they violated the
spectrum sharing policy. Following the self-reporting ap-
proach, the detection and forensic roles will be deducted from
the enforcer because parties report their violation act, in ad-
dition, reducing the risk of getting uncertain sanctions when
violating the spectrum sharing policy.
CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee report recommended the
NTIA to consider voluntary policing where the sharing en-
tities settle the issue without upgrading it to the NTIA or
FCC [40]. This recommendation would deduct the detection
and forensic roles from the enforcer because parties report
their violation act which would reduce the cost of ex-post
enforcement as a result comparing to the cost of the ex-post
enforcement without the self-reporting approach. In addition,
following this recommendation would reduce the risk of get-
ting uncertain sanctions when violating the spectrum sharing
policy.
Unfortunately, the recommendation of using a third party
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only as an enforcer is costly comparing to the self-reporting
enforcement. The CSMAC-enforcement subcommittee rec-
ommended to combine the two approaches (self-reporting
enforcement and third party enforcer) as an ideal solution to
resolve any interference event [40]. Following this recommen-
dation by combining the self-reporting enforcement and third
party enforcer, would not ultimately reduce the cost of the
ex-post enforcement because the enforcement system (which
is SAS) would be built on a centralized scheme with a closed-
database. In addition, it would not reduce the the adjudication
process costs too.
There is an alternative and better solution equivalent to the
combination approach between the third party enforcer and
self-reporting enforcement. The approach is by automating
enforcement system in the spectrum sharing regime. Au-
tomated enforcement system would reduce the cost of the
adjudication process [7]. In the past, the ways of automating
the enforcement system were costly and not feasible. The
following section will discuss the structure of the automated
enforcement systems and its requirements.
5. Toward The Structure of Automated
Enforcement Systems
The design of an automated enforcement system must begin
with the end goal: reliable evidence to support a predicable
and well defined adjudication process. Evidence in support
of a claim might include the documentation of an interfer-
ence event, which could include the location, time and date
where the event was detected, locations of the transmitters
and receivers that are affected by the event, the transmission
history of the transmitters in the area, other parameters, such
as antenna type and height, etc. For spectrum sharing systems
that use a database driven spectrum management system, such
as a Spectrum Access System (SAS), the transaction history
of the SAS is also critical. Reliable evidence means that all
parties are satisfied with the provenance of the information
that enters the adjudication process. The rest of the paper will
discuss a current technology that if used in the spectrum shar-
ing regime, it would be possible to automate the enforcement
system that is encountered with feasible proper costs. This
technology is called a Block-chain.
6. Block-chain Potential Applications to
Spectrum Sharing Systems
According to Adam Ludwin8[43]:
”A blockchain is a database . . . but it is different from a tradi-
tional database in two critical ways. First of all it is shared,
so in other words it is distributed to every participant . . . in
the network. . . . [T]he critical difference . . . is that in a
blockchain, the assets are controlled by the owners of the as-
sets, whereas in a traditional database, the assets are controlled
by whoever owns the database. So, it’s a system whereby the
8Adam Ludwin is the co-founder of Chain enterprise
asset owners retain control all the time over their assets even
as we’re using a data model in a network to transact.”
In this context, let us consider spectrum sharing systems. At
a high level, users transact to acquire transmission rights at
some price. In most cases, the users construct infrastructure
to use the transmission rights for some kind of information
transfer application. Spectrum as an economic good has the
property of being instantly renewable, which is also the prop-
erty that makes interference such a significant issue. In this
part, we will discuss the implication and limitation of employ-
ing the Block-chain to the spectrum sharing regime
6.1 Ex-post Enforcement using Block-chain as Publicly-
Distributed-Database
As mentioned, the Spectrum Access System (SAS) be respon-
sible for enforcement mechanisms on the spectrum sharing
policy. The Block-chain technology is publicly-distributed-
database that could be used for Spectrum Access System
(SAS). If the Block-chain is used as the publicly-distributed-
database for SAS, it will enable the requirement of enforc-
ing the collective action rights or the interference rights in
spectrum sharing systems. If the Block-chain technology is
deployed in the spectrum sharing regime to enforce the user’s
rights, it would serve as a publicly-distributed-database. The
Block-chain is empowered by cryptographic methods that
will: 1) allow it to function without any central authority, 2)
guarantee trust and reliability of the digital actions within the
database.
The Block-chain would expedite some of the ex-post enforce-
ment processes. Because the database would be distributed
and stores around all the participated nodes (PU, SU, and
the enforcer). As an example, the enforcer would not find
difficulties to gather the evidence because the data resides and
distributed among all the entities. Additionally, self-reporting
approach would be applicable when using the Block-chain
technology. And the sharing entities could avoid any uncertain
sanctions by following this approach.
6.2 Ex-post Enforcement using Smart Contract
Further, the smart contract application is another decentral-
ized application that can be used in the suggested spectrum
sharing regime. A Time Limited Lease (TLL) was proposed
to be used in the spectrum sharing regime to enforce the rights
between the sharing entities [44]. The idea is similar to a
smart contract, but different in the implementation. Where the
TLL relies on a hardware to be self-executed, while the smart
contract relies on a software application to be self-executed.
The smart contract application took the Block-chain imple-
mentation further than using a digital action as simple trades.
As such, the digital action could contain more embedded in-
formation when used in the smart contract. It would become
much easier to record, confirm, and execute the smart con-
tract when using the Block-chain technique under the smart
contract application. If the smart contract is used in the sug-
gested spectrum sharing regime, it can substitute any third
party provision of, such as lawyers to set up contracts, or
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financial institutions to guarantee payment, or enforcers to
apply the ex-post measures against the violators. The role
of the ex-post enforcement was examined and evaluated in a
cooperative spectrum sharing scheme [45, 10]. It was shown
that the cost of the ex-post enforcement plays a significant
role since sharing the spectrum will without doubt result in
interference events. The cost elements of the ex-post enforce-
ment may play an important role to effect on sharing parties’
decision [45]. If the smart contract is used in the spectrum
sharing regime, it might have significant impact on the cost
of the ex-post enforcement. Part of the ex-post enforcement
cost is the changeable enforcement cost. This changeable
enforcement cost ranges from attributing interference to the
appropriate party and penalizing the interferer, to collecting
the penalties. Employing the smart contract to execute the
ex-post enforcement mechanisms automatically would expe-
dite, and ease the process of the ex-post enforcement which
would lower the changeable enforcement costs to be almost
negligible. The implication on the ex-post enforcement would
generate an economic incentive for the entities to share the
spectrum.
6.3 Ex-post Enforcement as DAO
The most efficient approach to deploy the ex-post enforce-
ment in the spectrum sharing regime is by automating the
adjudication [46]. The full-automated-nodes or the automatic
scheme can be achieved by integrating two decentralized ap-
plications, such as smart contract and cryptographic currency.
The automatic scheme might have major impact on the spec-
trum sharing regime if it is used to enforce the spectrum
sharing rights between the sharing entities. Combining those
two applications may facilitate the automation of Machine-2-
Machine (M2M) communication and interaction without the
need of the human intervention. If this approach is used in the
spectrum sharing regime between the PU and SU, it would be
the most efficient approach for automating the adjudication
in the spectrum sharing that has been suggested [46]. Also, it
would guarantee the income stream for the PU, and expedite,
and ease the process of the ex-post enforcement when the
spectrum sharing rights are violated [45]. This method of au-
tomatization would have incentives from many perspectives,
such as resource benefits and economic incentives. However,
the economic incentives will not be applicable if the spectrum
sharing policy is not supporting it [10]. The automatization
method would be a further step to show the spectrum sharing
policymaker the economic, and resource incentives to share
the spectrum.
One of the challenges for the Block-chain technology that
is lacks of standardized processes in the Block-chain’s im-
plementations. This makes it difficult for the technology to
be adopted into the market. Additionally, because the Block-
chain technology is still in the research development stage, it
is hard to explain and even more difficult to specify how it can
be used in a system as publicly-distributed-database unless
the concept of the system is well explained. When using PoW
as a voting tool, the power and process consumption may
also become a limitation when used with devices that had
limited processors and power. This limitation can be avoided
if another voting tool, such PoS is used.
7. Conclusion
Interference rights and collective action rights enforcement
are necessity in spectrum sharing regime. Spectrum Access
System (SAS) was suggested by the CSMAC to facilitate the
enforcement mechanisms of these rights. Also, the collec-
tive action rights require transparency. If SAS is built on the
same concept as the current management system that has been
used in Telecommunications, it will be dependent on a central
authority to enforce spectrum sharing rights (centralized sys-
tem); and the same concept of closed-database usages will be
repeated and used in the spectrum sharing regime.
As we move to more intensive sharing of spectrum, the likeli-
hood of events that are enforceable ex post increases, despite
ex ante measures. The Enhancing Access to the Radio Spec-
trum (EARS) second workshop report [1] recognized this and
set the goal of lowering the costs by automating some of the
ex-post enforcement steps.
We introduced the Block-chain technology to be used for SAS
to facilitate the requirement of enforcing the collective action
rights as well as the interference rights in spectrum sharing
systems. Block-chain is a technology is a publicly-distributed-
database that can be used in any system. It can be defined as a
resilient, reliable, transparent and decentralized way of storing
and distributing a database across all nodes of a network.
Block-chain technology to automate the ex-post enforcement
processes. The potential usages can be divided into three
applications: 1)ex-post Enforcement using Block-chain as
Publicly-Distributed-Database, 2) ex-post Enforcement using
Smart Contract, 3) and ex-post Enforcement as Decentralized
Autonomous Organization (DAO). If Block-chain technology
is used for SAS as publicly-distributed-database, it would
create the opportunity of spectrum sharing regime to be open,
reliable, and democratic.
The spectrum sharing policymaker could decide to use fur-
ther decentralized application that benefits from using the
Block-chain technology, such as a smart contract application.
It becomes much easier to record, confirm, and execute the
sharing rights between the PU and SU’s. This would create
economic incentives for the entities to share the spectrum.
Further, The spectrum sharing policymaker could decide to
use further decentralized application that benefits from using
the Block-chain technology, such as a smart contract applica-
tion. Doing that, It would be easier to record, confirm, and
execute the sharing rights between the PU and SU’s. This
would create economic incentives for the entities to share the
spectrum. The possibility of automating the ex-post enforce-
ment by deploying the M2M approach was discussed. The
automatization method will be a further step to gain more
economic incentives, and resource benefits.
Exploring how Block-chain could support other functional
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groups of Spectrum Access System (SAS) and looking at SAS
architecture will be on future work.
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Appendix A
Block-chain Technology
After the internet become available to the public in the 1990s,
money itself, and the methods of transferring it, converted to
electronic form. Cryptographic currency was introduced as a
new electronic9 form of money, which represented the cash
equivalent of transferring physical currency between hands.
Cryptographic currency (equivalent to cash) can be issued,
or produced, based on either centralized or decentralized cur-
rency systems, such as Bitcoin, Ripple, Litecoin, WebMoney
or Dogecoin. Cryptographic currency is preferable to users
for the following reasons [47]:
1. Enables the user to stay relatively anonymous
2. Easy to navigate
3. May have low fees
4. Is accessible across the globe with a simple internet
connection
5. Can be used to store and make international transfer
value
6. Does not typically have transaction limits
7. Generally secure
8. Features irreversible transactions
There are 500 selections of decentralized cryptographic cur-
rencies10 available on the internet [48]. Bitcoin is one of the
most popular and famous cryptographic currencies, and it is
produced based on a decentralized currency system. It was
introduced by Satochi Nakamoto (pseudonym) in 2008 [26].
Bitcoin is a digital coin11 that operates on a peer-to-peer net-
work [49, 50, 51, 48, 52, 53]. This means that every node
that runs a Bitcoin client is in charge of keeping track of all
the transactions, regulating the money supply, and supplying
currency. Bitcoin transactions are based on cryptographic
9The idea “electronic money” is an electronically deposited money value
that symbolizes a right on the developer (the value it equals is no more than
the amount it was paid for), and is accepted by parties other than the developer
[28]. The cryptographic currency, to date, is accepted within a specific digital
world, unregulated, the supply of money varies, not guaranteed for cashing the
fund, unsupervised, and has many types of risk. That means the cryptographic
currency scheme can be considered a specific type of electronic money that
is the cash equivalent of transferring electronic money.
10“Digital currency”, “virtual currency”, “Crypto currency”, and “crypto-
graphic currency” are all terms used for the cash equivalent of transferring
electronic money. In this paper, we use the term Cryptographic currency.
11Digital coin or digital token are both general terms for a Bitcoin unit. In
this paper, we will use the term digital token. The digital token is nothing
other than a unique number that cannot be replicated and is generated using
the cryptographic method.
Figure 5. Centralized, decentralized, and distributed database
concepts that is adopted from Paul Baran communication
network classification [55].
proof, instead of trust, by permitting any two agreeable nodes
to transact openly with each other without needing a trusted
third party. It is not dependent on a central entity (such as a
central bank) to be produced, stored, or distributed. Bitcoin
not only acts as cash and payment, but can also symbolize
countless kinds of property.
Bitcoin was introduced as a cryptographic currency that takes
advantage of encryption methods to generate currency units
and approve transactions. It does not represent anything other
than a number [54]. A person can get a Bitcoin by: 1) ex-
changing physical currency (for example, $ US dollar, or
Euro), or 2) by using his computer to mine and be rewarded.
Mining is the process of using the computational processing
work of a person’s computer to solve a mathematical problem.
Bitcoin practices an exceptional and innovative strategy for
keeping and allocating its operation record [20]. To generate
a distributed database of operations that is both robust and
clear, it allocates all operations through all network’s nodes
[20]. The distributed-database is called Block-chain. The
reason for using the Block-chain technique in Bitcoin was to
avoid double spending [26]. The importance of Block-chain
came from the concept of a decentralized system to replace
the absolute centralized ones (and the middlemen) [56].
The concept of a distributed scheme is related to computer
engineering, and differs from centralized and decentralized
systems (see Figure 5) [55]. When we say distributed database,
we follow the concept in Figure 1-c that means that all the
nodes have the same authority and privileges. And when
a system is called decentralized, as in Figure 1-b, it means
some of the nodes have all the privileges, and some are simple
nodes that have no authority. In general, Block-chain is a
distributed system, but the applications are used for decentral-
ized systems, such Bitcoin and smart contracts. This is be-
cause the applications are designed to run on power and space
constrained devices where the new era of devices, such smart-
phones, tablets, or embedded systems, lack these features [21].
A copy of the publicly-distributed-database is maintained and
shared in every node on the Bitcoin network and is agreed
upon by means of a proof-of-work system. Block-chain tech-
nique relies on a digital signature to provide a public history of
transactions to prevent double-transactions [26]. Block-chain
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is the database in Bitcoin, and is responsible for storing and
distributing all Bitcoin’s transaction ledgers to all the nodes
in the Bitcoin network [49, 50, 51, 48, 57]. This database is
[58]: 1) open, 2) has decentralized authority, 3) is public, and
4) is accessible in one digital record through the network. The
Block-chain records all transactions that contain a date, time
and participants, and stores the value of each transaction [58].
The idea of Bitcoin’s Block-chain could be generalized be-
cause the Block-chain does not care whether the digital token
(Bitcoin unit) represents currency, value, or property. The
application can only decide on the representation of the dig-
ital token [58]. For example, smart contracts use the same
framework as Bitcoin by generalizing Block-chains to build
its application [23].
The Block-chain technique uses cryptographic techniques to
improve its reliability and functionality without the need for a
central trusted authority [20]. The Block-chain technique was
used in the late 1990s for different applications such as in ”A
public key watermark for image verification and authentica-
tion” [59], but it started to get famous and stood out when it
was introduced to support the Bitcoin [17]. The Block-chain
technology replaced the central authority, such banks by a
scattered consensus model. Block-chain uses a scattered con-
sensus model where a minimum number of nodes within the
network should approve the transaction (digital action). To
authenticate any transaction, there is a minimum number of
nodes needed to practice the authentication procedures and
ensure transaction is right. The involved nodes in the authen-
tication process are called Bitcoin Miners. Any suspicious
transaction will be rejected by the Bitcoin Miners if they do
not authenticate it.
Block-chain is a promising technology that can be used as
a publicly-distributed-database in any network [43], and it
may have more usage in the near future [17]. When using
Block-chain technology, the database is stored in each node
connected to the network [13]. It is used to store and distribute
any action in the network to all the nodes. Depending on the
action or application that it is needed for, Block-chain can be
used as a technology by itself or can be used to support other
technologies.
In the last two years in the United States, over $00 million
has been invested in Block-chain associated technology [15].
In addition, some of the largest financial companies funded
startup corporations to find Block-chain applications to be ap-
plied on Wall Street [15]. In fact, in 2015, the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)
lunched the Linq platform, based on Block-chain technol-
ogy, from the startup Chain to trade non-public shares [16].
IBM and Samsung are experimenting with Block-chain tech-
nology to power the Internet of Things (IoT) [17]. Swan
named the Block-chain as the fifth most disruptive comput-
ing paradigm after mainframes, PCs, the internet, and mo-
bile/social networking [13]. Andressen12 elected the Block-
chain technique as the most important invention since the
12Marc Andressen is an American entrepreneur and founder of Netscape.
internet itself [17, 18].
Block-chain is used as a supportive technique for Bitcoin [13].
Smart contract is another example of using Block-chain as
a supportive technology to implement and monitor contract
terms [14]. Nick Szabo proposed the idea of a smart con-
tract [19], but was not well-known until the emergence of
cryptographic currency [14]. Block-chain takes advantage of
cryptographic methods to guarantee both trust and reliability
of the blocks. The Block consists of digitally signed actions
that are approved by the network. Each Block contains a refer-
ence to its ancestor Block to form a Block-chain. Block-chain
technology can be used to support many types of applications
(financial, economic, market, cash transactions, government,
health, or science) [13].
How does Block-chain work?
Caetano [20] identified the Block-chain as a data structure
or a chain of blocks interconnected to form a public file that
records all digital action for a system. The digital actions are
clustered into blocks, broadcast to all nodes of a network, and
authenticated by a network of nodes. The acceptance of the
block would be determined based on the consensus of the net-
work of nodes. Crosby et al. [14] described the general idea
of a Block-chain. They did so by showing that the steps of
conducting a transaction in the Bitcoin network connected the
Block-chain to the Bitcoin (see Figure 6). In the Bitcoin net-
work, the approved transactions use cryptographic evidence as
a substitute for a trusted central authority (such as a bank) to
complete the transaction through the network. The transaction
is guarded by a digital signature using the Privatekey of the
sender and can be confirmed using the Publickey of the sender.
The transaction is broadcast to all nodes on the Bitcoin net-
work. The mining nodes (Miners) approve the transaction
by [14]: 1) confirming the digital signature of the sender,
which verifies the sender owns the cryptographic currency,
2) inspecting each transaction that has been conducted by
the sender through the publicly-distributed-database to verify
the sender has sufficient funds in his account. After that, the
Miners record the transaction on the Block-chain (publicly-
distributed-database).
However, following these steps does not prevent the double-
spending problem because the transactions do not propagate
through the network and reach the destination in the order in
which they are made. In other words, there was a necessity
to develop a technique to make sure that the whole network
agrees on the order of the transactions. The technique that was
developed is the Block-chain technique that was introduced
to support Bitcoin transactions and prevent double spending
issues [14].
The transactions that happen at around the same time are
grouped in a Block [14]. Each block is interconnected to the
former one by referencing the former block’s hash. Hash is
a function that uses a cryptographic algorithm that can pro-
duce a fingerprint (small unique string of characters) for a
file (see Figure 7) [20]. If any changes happen to the file,
the fingerprint will be changed. In a Block-chain, the finger-
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Figure 6. How the Block-chain works in the Bitcoin network [14]
Figure 7. chain of Blocks [20]
print is added to the block and its transactions, along with the
fingerprint of the previous block. The fingerprints are then
used to provide authorization of the block. The outcome is a
distributed and cryptographically protected database of digital
actions.
The Block-chain is simply a chain of Blocks that represent a
public ledger stored and distributed among all the nodes of a
network. Depending on the application that it is used for, a
Block records all the digital actions between the nodes of a
network, which contain the date and time, and a reference to
its ancestor Block [17]. Figure 7 shows how the Block-chain
is interconnected from the first Block to the last one and the
assembly of the Block. The Block consists of a header, Block
size, digital action counter, and list of digital actions [21].
The digital action contains contributors, the date, time, and
activity. In Bitcoin, the average size of the digital actions
(transactions) is, at a minimum, 250 bytes; and the average
Block holds over 500 digital actions, while the header size is
fixed to 80 bytes [21]. The header fields of each Block are
a time stamp, nonce, a hash of previous Blocks, and Merkle
root [22]. The time stamp is the approximate creation time of
the Block. The nonce is a counter used to ensure each digital
action is only handled one time [23]. The hash of the previous
Block is used to link this block to the prior one to construct
the chain of Blocks. The Merkle root is the Hash of the Block
(Block’s fingerprint). It is a digest of all the transactions in
the Block [21]. The Merkle root is used to verify the integrity
of the Block. As shown in Figure 7, the Merkle root is created
by repeatedly digesting pairs of digital actions until there is
one root hash [21].
Mining and Consensus
In the previous subsection, we covered how the Block-chain
works and why it was introduced to overcome the problem of
double-spending. However, there is another issue, which is
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as follows: any node in the network can collect unconfirmed
digital actions, create a Block, and announce it to the rest
of the network to be eligible to be added to the Block-chain
[14]. This raises some concerns, notably: 1) which Block
would be succeeding in the Block-chain and how would a
network agree on it? 2) The Block could come in different
sequences through different nodes in the network leading
to a loss of reliability of the Block-chain sequence. 3) The
Blocks could be created at the same time. To overcome these
matters, mining mechanisms and consensus models between
the network’s nodes was introduced.
Mining
When a new digital action needs to be validated and added
to the Block-chain, the Mining procedure is used [21]. It is
used to protect the Block-chain against falsified digital actions
(such as double-spending in a Bitcoin network or void signa-
tures) [21, 24]. Miners13 authenticate new digital actions and
add them to the publicly-distributed-database [21]. Digital
actions are grouped into a single Block and are validated pe-
riodically14. However, in other cryptographic currency such
Litecoin, the transactions are grouped in a single Block ev-
ery 10 minutes [20]. Miners compete amongst each other to
find a solution to intensive and pressing mathematical puzzles
[27]. The greater the processor’s power the miners put in, the
greater the chance of finding the solution and wining. If a
miner solves the mathematical puzzle, the miner broadcasts
the Block of the digital-actions to all the nodes of the network
to be approved. This approval step is called Consensus model.
All the other nodes in the network check the Block to verify
that the miner solved the Mathematical puzzle. If more than
fifty percent of the nodes agree, that Block of digital-actions
is added to the Block-chain [27].
Mining is the process of solving a challenging mathematical
problem (mathematical riddle) based on the cryptographic
hash algorithm. Miners participate to solve the mathematical
problem by applying the Hash function to the block header
frequently by changing one parameter until the outcome string
of characters matches a certain goal [21]. The mining process
is achieved by harnessing the computing power of the Miners
to discover valid Blocks [28].
To solve the mathematical problem, mining software runs the
voting tool in order to reach consensus between the nodes.
The most common voting tool is Proof of Work (PoW); it
is used in the Bitcoin network and was introduced in 2002
[30]. To validate a Block using PoW, a certain cryptographic
hash, including the Block’s component, is formed, and must
be below a threshold value (miners need to complete a brute-
force exploration for a partial hash collision) [31]. This is to
guarantee that a Block cannot be altered without doing all the
13Miners is a generalized term and they are equivalent the Bitcoin Miners.
14In the Bitcoin network, the transactions are grouped in single Blocks
every ten minutes on average [25]. Ten minutes is the average time to find a
Block. The ten minutes was Nakamoto’s choice as a trade-off between first
confirmation time and the amount of work wasted due to chain split [26].
However, in other cryptographic currencys, such Litecoin, the transactions
are grouped in a single Block every two minutes [20]
work associated with finding the hash collision [31]. There
are other types of voting tools, such Proof of Stack (PoS)
[32] and Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP) [33]. Peercoin
is a cryptographic currency that uses PoW as a voting tool
and, in addition, can use PoS as an alternative voting tool as
well [32]. Vumi is a mobile messaging application, currently
under development, that will be built using SCP as its voting
tool [34]. This paper will use PoW as the voting tool and
will explain it in greater detail (see section 5.2.3). Explaining
other voting tools is beyond the scope of this work and will
be left for future work.
Depending on the application of the Block-chain, Miners re-
ceive rewards for using their computational power to solve the
mathematical problem. For example, in the Bitcoin network
the rewards are coins for every new block, in addition to trans-
action fees from all the transactions within the Block [21].
These rewards motivate the Miners to secure the network,
while at the same time executing the distributed monetary
system.
Consensus model
Caetano mentioned that, by nature, any network can be made
up of good or bad nodes [20]. The good nodes only agree
to take valid digital actions and refuse unacceptable digital
signatures (such as double-transactions in a Bitcoin network).
The bad nodes can be defined as a node that agrees to take
corrupted digital actions or chooses to refuse other digital
actions. The consensus among the nodes of the network is
used to separate and discard the bad nodes. Also, the con-
sensus among the nodes of the network controls a Block’s
acceptance. If the network’s nodes do not reach an agreement
on a Block, this Block is corrupted and will be counted as
an orphan. A fork in the Block-chain is a result of finding a
corrupted Block.
The Block-chain consensus model requires all nodes in the
network to come to an agreement on adding a new block of
the digital actions, since there is no central authority that can
make the choice [17]. The Consensus model is a democratic
agreement process used between the Miners to authenticate or
reject the digital actions. The digital actions are authenticated
by a network of nodes called Miners using cryptographic tech-
niques to: 1) sustain the record book, and 2) ensure that the
Miners agree on the recent state of the public record and every
digital action in it [58]. Miners are the nodes that validate
new digital actions by using computational power to solve
a mathematical riddle. Whenever a solution is found, a new
Block is validated and attached to the Block-chain [31]. The
Miners will reject any suspicious activity if they do not get
approval from all the participating nodes. The Democratic
consensus process (Consensus model) between the Miners
can be compared to the notarization process, which means
there is a notary for every transaction [58]. This is why Block-
chain is trusted; there is a guarantee that a Block cannot be
altered without redoing all the work involved in finding the
hash collision.
The consensus model occurs from the interaction of the fol-
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lowing practices [21]:
1. Each node verifies each transaction independently. This
verification occurs when a list of measures are met.
2. Miners combine the new transactions independently
plus proof-of-work which is a solution to the PoW al-
gorithm.
3. Nodes verify the new Blocks independently and then
add it to the Block-chain.
4. Each node selects independently a chain with the maxi-
mum increasing computation confirmed through PoW
7.0.1 Proof-of-Work (PoW)
A Proof-of-Work algorithm shows that the miners involved a
significant amount of computational energy and, on the other
side, it can be easily verified [60]. Proof-of-Work uses SHA-
256 to generate a unique hash value for each block in the
Block-chain [26]. By linking the hash of a new block to the
hash of the prior block in the chain through all the previous
baths to the hash of the origin block, then the connectivity of
the Block-chain is succeeded.
As mentioned, SHA-256 takes variable size input-data and
generates 64 hexadecimal digit number which is called a
fingerprint for the input-data. If a number is added to the
input-data, a different fingerprint would be generated (see
Figure 8) [21]. Figure 8 shows that each phrase generates
totally different fingerprints, but anyone can produce the exact
outcome from any computer when using the same hashing
algorithm. The variable number that is used in Figure 8 is
called a nonce [21]. The usage of the nonce is to change the
output of the hashing algorithm which changes the fingerprint.
If we set a random goal of finding an expression that generates
a fingerprint that begins with number (0) in hexadecimal, it
will create a challenge in the hashing algorithm.
The output of the PoW algorithm should have a mathematical
property, that property requires that when an input message
is concatenated with a nonce and make them the input to the
hashing algorithm, the resulting fingerprint have to have a
large prefix of 0′s [60].
The length of the output string from the SHA-256 algorithm is
256 bits no matter what the input. If the miner is looking for
a fingerprint that contains 50 consecutive 0’s in it, that would
require him to perform 250operations of the hashing algorithm
to find that string of characters [60]. In the example in Figure
8, it was looking for the first four consecutive zero bits (first
zero in hexadecimal) and the wining nonce was 7, which can
be verified by any person autonomously. If he added nonce 7
to the phrase “Block-chain input-data” and ran the SHA-256
algorithm, he will get the same output string of characters.
That successful result is also proof-of-work that proves the
miner did the work to find that nonce number. Despite the
fact that it took one run of the hash algorithm to be proven
yet took 7 runs of the hashing algorithm to find a nonce that
satisfies the conditions.
Block-chain’s PoW algorithm is similar to the example above
[21]. The miner creates a nominee Block packed with digital-
actions. Then, the Miner computes the fingerprint of this
Block’s header to see if it less than the current target, which
is the current number of sequential 0′s of the prefix of the
fingerprint. If the hash is greater than the target, the Miner
needs to update the nonce by increasing the nonce by one and
computing the fingerprint again.
Smart Contract
The traditional contract is an agreement with precise terms
among two or more entities promising to conduct and act or
prohibit it in exchange for something else [61]. To satisfy an
entity’s responsibility, each entity should trust the other entity
[14]. Smart contract covers the same concept of the traditional
contract of doing or not doing the act with a revocation of
the trust condition. The smart contract terms are defined and
enforced automatically by computer code. The smart contract
is autonomous, decentralized, and a self-sufficient application
[14].
The idea of the smart contract was introduced that had been
introduced by Nick Szabo [19]. The concept of the smart con-
tract can be defined as encrypted containers. These containers
enclose values and only expose when assured situations are
happened [23]. In other words, the idea of a smart contract is
that contract terms are enforced and executed automatically
among the participating entities without the need of an en-
forcer or a third party. Smart contracts were not well-known
until the emergence of cryptographic currency based on the
Block-chain technique [14].
The smart contract application took the Block-chain imple-
mentation further than simple simple digital action, such as
trades. The digital action may contain more embedded infor-
mation when used in the smart contract [13]. Block-chains,
when used under the smart contract application as publicly-
distributed-database, will allow the participated entities to
confirm a situation or event occurrence without the need for a
third-party [18]. It becomes much easier to record, confirm,
and execute the smart contract when using the Block-chain
technique under the smart contract application [14]. The
smart contract can substitute any services that are provided
by a third party, such as lawyers to form contracts, transfer
property under certain conditions, or financial organizations
to buy/sell merchandise/services.
The smart contract may represent the deployment of an agree-
ment between entities. The smart contract’s source code will
reinforce the legal requirements. Wright and Filippi recom-
mend that before the deployment of the smart contract, to
support the reliability of the source code the smart contract’s
entities, there needs to be a model to prototype the contract’s
performance [18]. The smart contract is not a replacement of
traditional physical contracts, but instead complement each
other. The smart contract permits mutual problems to be re-
solved in a way that minimizes the necessity for trust [14].
Smart contracts’ entities may need to enter into the traditional
physical contract to cover non-technical matters.
The smart contract usage is to enable the trade of merchandise
between unrelated people on the internet without the need
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Figure 8. SHA-256 output of a characters of generating different fingerprint by iterating on a nonce. the data is generatd using
free online tool called Free or matter
http://www.freeformatter.com/sha256-generator.htmlad-output
Human interaction Computerization
Human establishments X X
Automatic scheme X X
DAO X X
System of systems X X
Table 3. The relationship between different types of automating schemes
for a central authority [18]. Recently, the smart contract was
created to automatically perform derivatives, futures, swaps,
and options. One usage of the smart contract is that it can
be used for betting15 by setting a programmed compensation
[13]. The smart contract can be automated to release a com-
pensation if a threshold of a definite share or exchange good
is triggered. There are many applications that enable smart
contract applications on top of the Block-chain technique,
such Ethereum, Codius, and Ripple.
Ethereum was proposed by Vitalik Buterin in 2014 [23]. It is a
platform that provides a lot of interesting programmable abil-
ities to build and publish decentralized applications built on
the top of the Block-chain technique [14]. Any entity can use
Ethereum to: 1) enable smart contracts, 2) generate its own
cryptographic currency (sub-cryptographic-currency), and 3)
use that to execute and pay for the terms of the smart contract.
Ether is the cryptographic currency for the Ethereum network,
which is used to pay a fee for the provided services. Buterin
categorized the usages of Ethereum to three classes which are:
financial16, partially financial17, and non-financial18 applica-
tions [23]. The financial applications supply customers with
more dominant methods by using their cash to manage and
enter into agreements. There are partially financial applica-
tions, when cash is involved, but, on the other side, there is a
heavy non-financial side that is also being completed.
Cryptographic Currency
Cryptographic currencies are the earliest applications that
used Block-chain technique as a publicly-distributed-database
[18]. Cryptographic currency (equivalent to cash) can be is-
sued or produced based on either centralized or decentralized
currency systems. This paper is concerns specifically with
15In finance, it is a limit order.
16Sub-cryptographic-currency, derivatives, or determinations.
17Solving computational problem by self-enforcing donation.
18Voting, or decentralized governance.
decentralized cryptographic currencies that rely on the Block-
chain technique. In 2008, Satochi Nakamoto (pseudonym)
introduced the most well-known decentralized cryptographic
currency, the Bitcoin, empowered with a distributed system
known as Block-chain[26]. Bitcoin is unlike physical curren-
cies that depend on a trusted central authority (Governments
or Banks) to be produced. Instead, Bitcoin depends on a com-
pletely decentralized system because everything is based on
cryptographic proof as an alternative of trust [18]. There are
two ways of getting the Bitcoin. The first one is by trading
physical currency (i.e., $ US dollar, or Euro). The second way
is by participating in the mining process and getting rewarded.
Bitcoin rewards drop whenever 210,000 blocks are added to
the Block-chain. The rewards started at 50 Bitcoins per block
in 2009. In 2012, this rewards were reduced to 25 Bitcoins
per block and it will be halved almost quadrennially. That is
because the Bitcoin is limited to roughly 20million Bitcoins
in total [21]. Other cryptographic currencies, such Litecoin,
have a total supply of around 84 million coins.
From the time Bitcoin was lunched, there have been 500 se-
lections of decentralized cryptographic currencies available
on the internet, such as Ripple, Litecoin, WebMoney or Do-
gecoin. Bitcoin does not structure the digital token that a
person has. Instead it is structured as a movement of rights
from a previous owner to a succeeding owner [62]. Crypto-
graphic currency is, in general, secure. It allows us to hand
over funds around the world within a couple of minutes, with
no transaction limits, and with negligible fees compared to
the current funds handover system that takes a couple of days,
with transaction limits, and high fees to do that [18]. The
cryptographic currency is accessible across the world with a
computer device connected to the internet or smartphone.
Decentralized-Autonomous-Organizations (DAO)
Decentralized-Autonomous-Organizations (DAO) is a gen-
eral term given to any future Block-chain application [29].
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DAO can represent the performance of any centralized entity
in recent time. DAO can represent the performance of any
centralized entity in recent time. The DAO does not mean
the system is fully-automated but it is one of the automating
schemes. Matilla gave a brief identification and differentiate
between the automating schemes (see Table ??).
also, Matilla argues that merging two decentralized applica-
tions that are empowered with Block-chain technology, such
smart contract and cryptographic currency, makes it possi-
ble to construct fully-automated-nodes within a network [29].
Those fully-automated-nodes represent an automatic (robotic)
scheme. Table 3 shows Matilla’s categorization of the rela-
tionship between different types of automating schemes.
